Was de oorlog in Irak een oorlog om olie?

vr, 19/04/2019 - 19:41

Tijd voor een geschiedenisles. Een belangrijke blijvende mythe is de bewering dat de tweede Irak-oorlog uitgevochten werd omwille van de oliebelangen van Amerikaanse bedrijven. Deze mythe werd overigens ook bevestigd door Alan Greenspan in zijn memoires, dus is er geen reden om aan te nemen dat het fout zou zijn. Toch is het zo.

Zelf ben ik altijd sceptisch geweest. Managementgoeroe Peter Drucker had destijds vernomen van diverse CEO's van oliemaatschappijen dat ze verbaasd waren dat Bush dan toch Irak had aangevallen. Aangezien Drucker toen zowat de enige was die dat beweerde, kon ik mijn skepcis niet hard maken. Tot voor kort. In een lang artikel over 9/11 verwijst Amerikaans politicus Ron Unz naar een reeks interviews die de New York Times had met Texaanse oliebaronnen (bedrijfsleiders die dus dicht bij de Bush-regering aanleunden). Rapporteert Unz:

"During the drive to the Iraq War, I read Times articles interviewing numerous top oil men in Texas who expressed total puzzlement at why America was planning to attack Saddam, saying that they could only assume that President Bush knew something that they themselves did not. Saudi Arabian leaders were adamantly opposed to an American attack on Iraq, and made every effort to prevent it. Prior to his joining the Bush Administration, Cheney had served as CEO of Halliburton, an oil services giant, and his firm had heavily lobbied for the lifting of U.S. economic sanctions against Iraq."

Verdere bevestiging wordt gegeven in het boek van Susan Lindauer, één van de whistleblowers rond 9/11. Zij beschrijft in dat boek hoe in een geval van geheime diplomatie Irak bereid was om in te gaan op alle wensen van de Verenigde Staten inclusief het verlenen van concessies aan Amerikaanse oliemaatschappijen en de aankoop van olie materiaal:

"Over the next 18 months of back channel talks, Iraq’s offer to the United States came to encompass all of the following:

1. As of October, 2000, Baghdad agreed to resume U.N. weapons inspections. That was 18 months before the world community was told of Baghdad’s acquiescence.

2. As of October, 2000, Iraq promised to include U.S. Oil Companies in all future oil exploration and development concessions. Taking contracts from Russia or European countries would have been controversial, and politically impossible. However, Iraq had ways of cutting U.S. Oil into the mix of existing contracts. Iraq also promised to invest in major purchases of U.S. oil equipment, which it freely declared to be the best in the world.

3. Baghdad offered to buy 1 million American-made automobiles every year for 10 years to replace its citizens’ outdated fleet of automobiles. Because of purchase restrictions under U.N. sanctions, most automobiles in Iraq predated the mid 1980s. Iraq’s imports of U.S. automobiles would have translated into thousands of high-paying Labor Union jobs in the Rust Belt of the United States— concentrating heavily in Michigan, Ohio, Indiana and Pennsylvania, which otherwise have been crippled by the loss of factory investment. It would have guaranteed a foundation of prosperity for America’s workers.

4. Iraq promised to give the U.S. priority contracts in telecommunications products and services.

5. Iraq agreed to grant priority contracts to U.S. health care, hospital equipment and pharmaceuticals, in any post-sanctions period.

6. Iraq promised to give priority to U.S. factory equipment, and allow U.S. Corporations to reenter the Iraqi Market at the level that they enjoyed prior to the 1990 Gulf War. Dual use military equipment and factory production was exempt from this promise. Dr. Fuisz gave critical testimony in the Congressional investigation of U.S. corporations that supplied weapons to Iraq before the first Gulf War. There was no danger he would have tolerated or mistakenly supported dual-use contracts, in addressing opportunities for American corporations in post-sanctions Iraq.

7. Iraq agreed to contribute as a major partner in U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.

Time and again, Baghdad made it crystal clear: Any special preference Washington demanded, the United States could have—anything at all. Every offering was reported to Andy Card and my CIA handler, Dr. Fuisz. We followed the same strategy and reporting process that had worked so successfully during the Lockerbie talks."

Oliemaatschappijen hadden met andere woorden geen enkel belang bij een oorlog, maar veeleer in het opheffen van de sancties. 

Als het echter niet om olie was, wat dan wel?

Ron Unz:

Prof. James Petras, a scholar of strong Marxist leanings, published an excellent 2008 book entitled Zionism, Militarism, and the Decline of US Power in which he conclusively demonstrated that Zionist interests rather than those of the oil industry had dominated the Bush Administration in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and promoted the Iraq War.

Verder bewijs wordt gegeven door een onverdachte bron:

"Why would Iraq attack America or use nuclear weapons against us? I’ll tell you what I think the real threat (is) and actually has been since 1990 – it’s the threat against Israel," Zelikow told a crowd at the University of Virginia on Sep. 10, 2002, speaking on a panel of foreign policy experts assessing the impact of 9/11 and the future of the war on the al-Qaeda terrorist organisation."

Philip Zelikow zou later de uitvoerend directeur worden van de 9/11 Commissie.